The Need to Strategize India-Pakistan Dialogue

“To Indians, cycles constitute the basis of life and stand in stark contrast to the Western linear view of time….in the Indian view, the cosmos also goes through repeated cycles of creation, decay, destruction and recreation…a cyclical view suggests no past and no future, just a continuing series of cycles.”
Though, I mostly disagree with George Tanham’s much famous analysis of India’s strategic culture, I could not but think about these words of Tanham before and after the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met on February 25.

Avoiding the temptation of turning this post into a historical narrative, I shall refer to the recent history of Indo-Pakistan dialogue. In 1997, high-level Indo-Pakistani talks resumed after a 3-year pause. In September the same year, talks were stalled over the issue of how dialogue should be structured. The nuclear tests of 1998 resulted in expected strains. In February 1999, P.M. Vajpayee Lahore Bus diplomacy resumed hopes of dialogue once again, soon to be crushed under the weight of the Kargil intrusions. After refusing to talk to a military dictatorship for years, Indian P.M. finally met General Musharraf in 2001 at Agra. December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament raised tensions in the subcontinent with both sides mobilizing forces during the first quarter of 2002. Tempers began to cool in 2003, followed by extensive talks. Mumbai 2008 once again stalled talks or in the populist jargon derailed the peace process. The Foreign Secretaries meeting last week was the first bilateral interaction between India and Pakistan after the Mumbai terror strikes.
The most common idiom defining Indo-Pakistan relations would be “resumption of dialogue”. India’s political leadership (whom I earlier referred to as ‘policymakers’, but have given up the term in the absence of much ‘policy’ in our foreign relations) claims that they cannot wish away Pakistan’s existence as a neighbor and thus have to devise ways and means of dealing with this difficult neighbor. They however, forget that with the acceptance of Pakistan as a neighbor also comes the need and reality of dealing with terrorism. Expecting the Pakistan should with terrorism and India should only deal with Pakistan is wishful thinking; India will have to deal with Pakistani state and terrorism through instruments of foreign policy. This realization is imperative to break the cycle of dialogue, tension, breakdown of dialogue and resumption of talks.
If India premises (as it claims to) dialogue with Pakistan on the condition that the latter shall end support for terrorist activities in India, collapse of the dialogue process is assured. Whether Pakistan is unwilling or incapable of curbing terrorism is different issue, the precondition is simply preposterous. It is in India’s interest that Pakistan stops sponsoring terrorism, but assuming that moral reasoning and diplomatic pressure will push Pakistan in that direction is naïve. Even the U.S. dollars and drones have not completely succeeded in forcing Pakistan to abandon support for terrorism.
Moreover, the degree to which a terrorist attack affects dialogue process depends on the Government; Mumbai did adversely affect bilateral dialogue, but Pune did not. What yardstick does the Government employ to suspend talks in the wake of a terrorist attack….number of causalities or media coverage?
It is not sufficient for India to have a Pakistan policy. India needs to develop a terrorism policy in the view of the fact that Pakistan is a spring board for launching terror strikes on India. India’s counter-terrorism policy has to take cognizance of Pakistan but the Pakistan policy should not be wholly premised on terrorism. The lack of coherence in India’s Pakistan policy and counter-terrorism policy is the reason for the cyclical relations without much forward movement. It is imperative for the Government of India to decide and makes public its stand on:
1. The status of dialogue if another terrorist attack hits India. Will Secretary-level talks be suspended if terrorists with links to Pakistan cause civilian causalities in India?
2. What will be the status of dialogue, if no Pakistan aided terrorist attack occurs in India, but at the same time no action is taken against Hafeez Saeed?
3. What explicit steps does India expect Pakistan to take on countering terrorism before Heads of State meet?
4. Will dialogue be affect if the military regime replaces civilian government?
5. Will trade dialogue between the two countries continue to remain hostage to the dominance of strategic dialogue? There is much that India needs to do with regard to opening its market to Pakistani textile and garment exports. 

There is absolutely no doubt that the menace of Pakistan supported terrorism is hurting India, but it is equally true that Indo-Pakistan have remained sour even before low intensity conflict began in J&K. The period between 1972 and 1989 was one of considerable peace, but as Sumit Ganguly remarks it was ‘cold peace’.
K. Subrahmanyam’s insightful analysis is worth nothing: “The issues that divide India and Pakistan are Kashmir, state-sponsored terrorism and nuclear question. None of them are capable of early solution through bilateral discussions because these are merely symptoms of more fundamental problems, over which the two nations have very little control.”
Even when India decides to discuss terrorism related issues with Pakistan, a prioritized to-do list is vital. Statements like “Pakistan should end its support for terrorist elements,” “credible action should be taken against LeT” are generalist remarks which leave no space for diplomatic give and take. India’s negative diplomacy of not talking to Pakistan unless the latter stops sponsoring terrorism needs to be replaced with positive diplomacy. The emphasis needs to shift to what India would do or rather can offer to Pakistan if the latter shows willingness to check cross border infiltration.  What economic incentives can India provide Pakistan if say no terror attack occurs for a year on Indian soil. Offering something to Pakistan is much more important than merely expecting Pakistan to act on terror-suspect lists or terror dossiers.

It is for the Government of India to decide: make terrorism the main plank of the dialogue process or strategize the dialogue process? Its a spread out platter and it is for India to make its choice!