South Waziristan Operation: Civilian Government Recedes, Army Takes Charge

The Rah-i-Nijat Operation in South Waziristan has provided the Pakistani Army an opportunity to re-claim the center-stage in Pakistan. Since the past fortnight, Pakistan has witnessed a disturbing series of terror strikes and the Army has initiated the ground offensive in South Waziristan. In these troubled times, public statements or media visibility of President Zardari and P.M. Gilani has been conspicuously low. Who is leading the current military offensive against the Taliban: Army or Civilian Government?

[Photo Courtesy: The Nation]

According to South Asia analyst, Shuja Nawaz, “The latest military campaign in South Waziristan, launched Saturday, is a good example of the disconnect between the government and the military. The government has ceded all strategic authority to the army, and without civilian leadership, no military strategy can succeed there.”�
Military operations are undoubtedly expected to be planned and executed by the Army, but the civilian government has an important role in approving, reviewing and communicating to the public the military strategy. President Zardari, who has eagerly presented the Pakistani case before the American public by writing articles in Wall Street Journal and Washington Post, has not bothered to clarify the objectives and strategies of the on-going operation to the Pakistani people. Interior Minister Rehman Malik can be credited with making impressive speeches adorned with defining phrases like “all roads lead to South Waziristan” and Pakistan is in “a state of war”. But sadly, Rehman Malik’s primary focus even in such challenging times continues to be directed towards India; he is busy justifying India’s involvement in Balochistan while the Taliban are targeting military headquarters and universities in Pakistani cities.
The civilian government had the opportunity to instill confidence among the Pakistanis by managing the situation in the cities while the Army was fighting a difficult battle in the tribal regions of Waziristan. But instead of mobilizing the police apparatus and related civilian agencies, the government decided to shut down schools and universities across the country. This action has further reinforced the popular perception that Army is the panacea for all problems in Pakistan.
The latest policy report from the International Crisis Group, examines the Talibanisation in FATA, and argues that only reforms that encourage political diversity, enhance economic opportunity, and guarantee civil and political rights will address the problem. The Report further suggests that the current military operation may well be a more extensive attempt to root out the Baitullah Mehsud network in South Waziristan but it remains an incomplete effort and could even prove counterproductive because of parallel efforts to reach or consolidate peace deals with rival TTP groups. It has yet to show that it will be directed at the Afghanistan Taliban or al-Qaeda strongholds.
Military operations and displacement in the absence of political reforms and economic opportunities is likely to further alienate the residents of FATA. “The state’s failure to provide basic services and support economic opportunity is contributing to the growth of the insurgency”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “Only long-term political and legal reforms that extend the law of the land to FATA will reverse this tendency”.
In the absence of the vacuum created by the non-visibility of the civilian leadership, the Army is using the opportunity to woo the Pakistani people and also the U.S. Alongside the much publicized non-military aid to Pakistan, the U.S. is rushing in equipment that would help with mobility, night fighting and precision bombing in South Waziristan. The Army is also eager to utilize this opportunity to redeem its prestige following the recent attacks on bastions of military strength and status. The Army has tactfully managed to ensure that the South Waziristan offensive is not open to media coverage, thereby avoiding any disagreement with the Army sponsored reports of success. There are no independent sources to confirm the reports of initial gains made by the Army just a day after the ground offensive began. No wonder journalists have referred to South Waziristan as an ‘information black hole’.�
It appears that the civilian government does not want to be closely associated with the South Waziristan offensive, in anticipation of its partial success or more likely complete failure. Such abdication of responsibility will further lower the civilian leadership’s credibility and project the Army as capable of taking and implementing tough decisions. Rah-i-Nijat Operation has made possible for the Army to craft an incremental comeback as the most reliable institution in Pakistan.