Pakistan set to Take the U.S. ‘Beyond the Vietnam Experience’

Since assuming office in January this year, President Obama made it clear that Pakistan was an area of grave concern for the U.S. counter-terrorism efforts around the globe. Review of strategy in Afghanistan led to the now famous acronym Af-Pak: an approach signifying the conjoined nature of problems and solutions for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Obama Administration was making a sincere attempt at resolving the Afghanistan crisis. Strategists in Washington and other Capitals across the globe welcomed (with skepticism) the new alignment of priorities and strategy proposed by the Obama administration. But it is now turning out that the Administration is in for an undesirable realization: if Afghanistan was viewed as re-living Vietnam, Pakistan is sure to take the U.S. beyond the “Vietnam Experience”.

Even with all possible rhetorical evasions, the U.S. has practically opened a war front in Pakistan. The current U.S. strategy in Pakistan bears an uncanny resemblance to the military offensive in Afghanistan started eight years ago. The fanfare and public declarations may be missing but the U.S. is at war with the ‘rogue’ elements within Pakistan. Given the strategic and technological innovations it is possible to say that the U.S. is ‘fighting’ the Taliban in Pakistan without stationing ground troops in the country. The only difference is that taking clues from the Afghanistan experience, military operations have been undertaken in concurrence with civilian efforts at ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local population. 

The ground offensive by the Pakistani forces has been closely coordinated and monitored by the U.S. The drone strikes have been used to loosen Taliban hideouts before the Pakistani forces launch the ground offensive. Baitullah Mehsud, Taliban’s top commander in Pakistan, was killed through the U.S. drone strike. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Director General of ISI, had recently been in the U.S. to coordinate the upcoming offensive in the Waziristan region. The U.S. has in a way outsourced the war effort to Pakistan military by providing intelligence and military aid to the latter. During the current financial year, Pakistan will receive US$3.02 billion in non-military and military assistance. Washington is planning to continue to pump billions of dollars into Pakistan in various forms of aid, from counter-insurgency to anti-narcotics to humanitarian relief.

The Vietnam experience refers to prolonged and massive military commitment by the U.S. without achievement of desired strategic objectives. The U.S. in fact faced major military reversals in Vietnam and ultimately withdrew forces from the region. In Pakistan, the military and civilian commitment of the U.S. will be large but the realization of failure would be slow, erratic and subtle. This implies that the U.S. will be able to gain ostensible military victories on the ground, hit militant camps in drone strikes, build roads and schools in Pakistan but will not be able to annihilate the terror networks that might become dormant. Since the realization of failure will not be as visible as in Vietnam, the thrust for withdrawal (read military and non-military aid) will not be strong enough to induce a change in U.S. policy with regard to Pakistan. The U.S. would therefore, continue to engage in Pakistan in a ‘no-win’ situation without an exit option. Moreover, since there are no ground troops in Pakistan, the emotionally charged withdrawal argument of not putting young American soldiers in jeopardy will not carry much conviction. 

The terror networks operating from Pakistan have shown remarkable degree of resilience by going underground and temporarily halting operations. India’s experience with Pakistan demonstrates the seasonal nature of terrorist activities emanating from across the LOC. The terror cells are bound be become dormant in the face of American military offensive and diplomatic pressure on the Government of Pakistan. But as soon as the U.S. would divert political attention and attempt to reduce aid commitments, the terror cells would be re-activated for the advantage of the Pakistani Government. Pakistan’s Former Ambassador to United States, Maleeha Lodhi’s advise on managing the Afghanistan situation proves my contention: “The point should not be to eliminate the Taliban – which is impossible – but to persuade it to agree to a deal.” The U.S. is fighting to dismantle the terror networks; Pakistan is acting to ensure that the Taliban behave properly and abide by the official dictates.
  �
The U.S. Government is excited that Pakistan has realized the threats emanating from the menace of terrorism. But has Pakistan realized this for the first time? Moreover, what makes the U.S. consider ‘Pakistan’ as a monolith political decision making unit? Is the U.S. unaware of the multiple and often contending centers power and decision making within Pakistan? Is it possible to ignore the Military-ISI-Government triangle characterized by constant power scuffles? The U.S. can possibly breathe easy as long as General Kiyani heads the Armed Forces, but is Kiyani to stay in-chagre forever? In an unexpected move, General Kiyani has sternly ruled out the possibility of U.S. drone strikes in Baluchistan. General Kiyani cannot be expected to suppress for long the anti-U.S. sentiment dominant among the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies.

In Vietnam, the opposing parties were clearly identifiable and the U.S. could take sides. The situation in Pakistan is very different. The voices of dissent are scattered and there are no clear favorites to choose from. The security situation in Pakistan is fragile and popular discontent is rising. Suicide bombers have started entering secure compounds dressed in uniforms of Pakistani security forces. With the exception of the Party in power, all other segments of the Pakistani polity and society are resentful of increased U.S. presence and interference in the country. According to officials and politicians close to the army, the Pakistani military and the intelligence agencies are concerned that DynCorp is being used by Washington to develop a parallel network of security and intelligence personnel within Pakistan. There is a sense that Pakistan is being treated as a tactical ally (used according to exigencies) rather than a strategic partner who is consulted and regularly informed. The covert sense of dislike is fast becoming visible with Pakistan rejecting 180 U.S. Government visa requests as ‘incomplete’.

Vietnam imbroglio allowed the U.S. to withdraw forces in the face of military reversals. In Pakistan the mirage of victory will be so achievable that the U.S. would be compelled to commit ‘some more’ resources to emerge victorious. Withdrawal in the face of opposition is better than chasing a mirage. Achievement of U.S. objectives in Pakistan is a mirage. Involvement in Pakistan will show the U.S. that something more painful exists beyond the Vietnam withdrawal syndrome.