Indo-US Relations: The Partnership Rhetoric Syndrome

U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s recent visit to India highlighted, more than anything else, the vision variance between the two countries. It has been proved that commitment to democracy and the rhetoric of shared vision cannot be panacea for inter-state differences. Disagreements are a part of bilateral relations but the divergence in approaches of India and the U.S. point to deeper schisms. It was a champion versus challenger duel in which the challenger is still lacking vital skills.

It is a widely know fact that India views itself as a major regional power aspiring for global leadership. Secretary Clinton very tactfully evaded any reference to or discussion of this claim during her visit. Secretary Clinton referred to India as an ‘economic power and a strategic partner’; there was no reference to India’s regional or global power potential. The first stop at Mumbai was not only a show of solidarity with the victims of the 26/11 terror attacks but also an attempt to highlight that U.S. was interested in engaging India’s economic rather than political potential.�
Pakistan was consciously not made a part of Secretary Clinton’s visit. To me the reason was not to address India’s Pakistan specific anxieties. The message was that India needs to interact with the U.S. without making Pakistan a reference point. Similarly, the U.S. did not want to appear India’s messenger in Pakistan. U.S. Special Envoy Richard Hoolbroke headed for Pakistan and Afghanistan on day that Secretary Clinton left India.
By staying at Hotel Taj and meeting the survivors of 26/11 terror attacks, Secretary Clinton had demonstrated that the US condemnation of terrorism does not translate into automatic conviction of Pakistan. On the contrary, Secretary Clinton referred to the demonstrated willingness of the Pakistani authorities to counter terrorism. In the words of Secretary Clinton, “In the last six months, we believe there is a commitment to fight terrorism that permeates the entire government (of Pakistan).”
The U.S. has not recognized or pretends not to notice the fact that fighting the Taliban in FATA is different from discontinuing support to violent forces in Jammu and Kashmir. India does not recognize the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists. According to India stopping all terrorist activities and dismantling the terrorist training grounds alone would contribute to improving Indo-Pakistan relations. The U.S. argument is that Pakistan is trying and that India should contribute by not exerting too much diplomatic pressure on a country which is equally traumatized by terrorism.
Secretary Clinton and Minister Jairam Ramesh face-off over the issue of responsibilities of nations with regard to carbon emissions made obvious the disparity of perspectives. Jairam Ramesh, probably considered a spoiler by the U.S. Administration, voiced India’s socio-economic exigencies as a valid detriment from committing to the specified carbon emission standards. He even mentioned the ‘crisis of credibility’ while referring to the inability of the developed countries to fulfill their pledges with regard to controlling per capita emissions.
Secretary Clinton’s visit was no doubt a great PR exercise. According to an article in the Washington Post, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reached out to the full spectrum of Indian society, sharing petits fours with corporate titans, including a man building a $1 billion home, and later munching nuts with rural women who embroider clothing for just dollars a day. She met Indian and Pakistani students interacting through the Seeds of Peace Students Exchange Program and had a discussion on education in a town hall meeting with Bollywood actor Amir Khan. It was only on the last day of the visit that Secretary Clinton was scheduled to meet the officials of the Indian Government.
India and the U.S. reached an agreement on monitoring end-use of military arms referred to by many as a new beginning in bilateral defense cooperation. The rationale of the EUMA (End Use Monitoring Agreement) is to ensure that the military technology provided by the U.S. to India is not transferred to other countries. What is being hailed in India as a strategic partnership is viewed as an economic opportunity in the U.S. According to Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, the deal presented a “major opportunity for American companies, and opens up as much as 10 billion dollars worth of exports to India’’. In a news piece run by the CBS on Secretary Clinton’s visit s similar comment appeared: the nuclear deal would give American companies exclusive rights to sell nuclear power plants at specified locations in India - an opportunity that could be worth $10 billion for U.S. sellers.

The end of the Cold war was interpreted as automatic stimuli for cordial Indo-U.S. relations. Certain common phrases are used to highlight the potential of bilateral relations between the “world’s oldest and largest democracy”. Both sides are committed to build an enhanced strategic partnership; cooperate to contribute to global prosperity and stability; committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world.
Such statements are a great ego-booster for India. The U.S. has continued to a follow a wholly serving policy with regard to India merely by expressing the above sentiments. India, on the other hand, has bargained away tangible concessions in return for ‘working towards a wider and deeper partnership’. The amiability of Indo-U.S. relations is not based on common commitment to democracy but on India’s non-bargaining tactics.
India’s involvement in the G8 (not to talk of Permanent Membership of the U.N. Security Council) has not been substantially endorsed by the U.S. On the issue of H1B visa quota, India’s considerations are conveniently overlooked. India’s regional security concerns with regard to China and Pakistan are brushed aside as India’s whimsical threat perceptions. If someone thinks that the U.S. has granted India a concession by signing the civilian nuclear deal, here is a fact to consider. A legislation, relating to actualizing the supplies under the deal, is pending in Indian Parliament that would shield U.S. suppliers from liability in the event of an accident, thereby allowing them to access insurance cover. Probir Purkayastha, a leading member of the Delhi Science Forum, told IPS that placing responsibility on Indian operators alone while protecting U.S. suppliers was “unacceptable” and likely to be challenged by human rights activists and also by opposition groups in parliament whenever it comes up.
This is what a NY Times Editorial on July18, 2009 read: India wants to be seen as a major world power. For that to happen, it will have to drop its pretensions to nonalignment and stake out strong and constructive positions. President Obama and Mrs. Clinton say they consider India a vital partner in building a stable world. Now they have to encourage India to behave like one.
In the words of Karl F. Inderfurth and Bruce Riedel, Indians feel that the three “D’s” – dominance, discrimination and double standards - have dominated the U.S. policy towards India. Secretary Clinton’s visit rather than being a ‘new beginning’ was merely a reassertion of the three “D’s” wrapped in a new rhetoric.