Understanding the J&K Dispute : Inter-State Dimension

Jammu and Kashmir, referred to as one of the most dangerous places on earth, is embroiled in one of the most misunderstood conflicts of modern times. The general perception is that J&K as a territorial conflict is rooted in religious sentiments between India and Pakistan. This inter-state aspect highlights merely one dimension of the more complex intertwined dyads of a deeper conflict. This four part analysis of the J&K conflict elaborates on the primary dimensions of the conflict: i) inter-state aspect involving the states of India and Pakistan; ii) intra-national dimension involving grievances of the people in the India administered regions of J&K towards the Government of India and the lack of democratic freedoms in the Pakistan administered areas of Kashmir, and iii) inter-regional linkages among the various sub-regions of undivided J&K.
The roots of the J&K conflict between India and Pakistan can be traced to the birth of the two nations in 1947. Pakistan’s adventurism, Maharaja Hari Singh’s helplessness and India’s opportunism sowed the seeds of a conflict that continues to threaten peace in the region. India and Pakistan have fought three wars and have been involved in several near war confrontations and skirmishes over J&K in the past six decades.
Mystery of J&K dispute is embroiled in the contradictory versions of the historic moment on October 26, 1947 when Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K signed the Instrument of Accession acceding to the Indian Union. Pakistan raises two objections with regard to accession of J&K to India: first, an unpopular Hindu ruler had no right to decide the fate of the entire population of J&K which had large number of Muslims; second, according to Pakistan, the Indian Government had through its Army forced the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession. The Indian position is that the Pakistani Army posing as tribal invaders was threatening to forcibly annex the state of J&K and India merely defended the state.
The U.N. Resolutions of 1948 and 1949 were aimed at the immediate cessation of hostilities in J&K and creation of conditions for resolving the conflict. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan have continued to disagree on the nature and mechanism of the final settlement. Pakistan insists on holding the UN proposed plebiscite throughout J&K to ascertain the preferences of the people with regard to accession with India/Pakistan or complete independence. Following the 1951 elections India considers the necessity for a plebiscite on its die of J&K as redundant because the people’s participation in the elections is an evidence of their willing accession to the India Union. India also holds Pakistan responsible for disrupting peace and stability in J&K by encouraging separatism and sponsoring terrorism.
The J&K dispute between India and Pakistan is a saga of how the two countries have oscillated between their respectively entrenched nationalist positions and artificially assumed conciliatory postures. Every major confrontation between India and Pakistan since 1947 has centered on J&K; and interestingly every confrontation is followed by a series of peace efforts where final resolution of the conflict is widely professed by each side.
From 1947 to 1971, India and Pakistan have fought three full scale wars. In 1947 and 1965 wars, J&K was the primary cause for the outbreak of hostilities. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War demonstrated that other dimensions of the India-Pakistan confrontation would inevitably come to involve J&K. Though the dispute remained much the same, the official approach to address the J&K issue had changed by 1971. Both sides agreed under the Shimla Agreement to address the dispute bilaterally through dialogue. India alleges that Pakistan has continuously violated the Shimla Agreement by internationalizing the J&K dispute.
The nature of the confrontation has somewhat transformed. With the exception of Kargil in 1999, Indo-Pakistan confrontations over J&K have been in the form of heightened tensions, diplomatic offensives and offensive military posturing. Operation Brasstacks (1986-1987) and Operation Parakaram (2002) were instances when the militaries were poised for combat but did not result in outbreak of hostilities. From National Parliaments to SAARC Summits; from cricket pitches to economic interactions; from U.N. General Assembly sessions to Human Rights forums, India and Pakistan have exhibited their mutual rivalry over J&K in every conceivable way.�
After several rounds of confrontations and conciliations India and Pakistan have failed to address the J&K dispute. India emphasizes on building mutual trust through developing stronger political and economic relations before the complex issue of J&K is addressed. For Pakistan development of mutual trust is contingent upon the resolution of the J&K dispute. The fencing of the LOC by India in 2004 was criticized as making the partition of J&K de jure and resolution of the dispute more difficult. The seven unit conglomeration solution offered by Former President Musharraf in 2004 was rejected by India. India claims to be fighting forces of separatism and militancy in J&K aided and abetted by Pakistan;  Pakistan claims to be countering Indian domination in J&K by supporting the freedom struggle. After six decades both countries continue to disagree on the root causes, definition and nature of the dispute; under the given circumstances the possibility of their agreeing on a mutual solution appears highly improbable. The J&K dispute continues to simmer while India and Pakistan justify their exclusive perceptions and minimalist solutions.