Sympathize, Empathize or Rationalize: Obama Administration’s Policy Choices in Pakistan

As the AFPAK strategy session concluded in Washington arguments for and against providing aid to Pakistan dominated the op-ed columns and the blogosphere. The U.S. cannot deprive Pakistan of essential aid because there are fears that the Country might collapse. At the same time U.S. aid will not solve most of Pakistan’s problems. So what should the Obama Administration do? Can the U.S. merely feel sorry for the state of affairs in Pakistan or should the challenges facing the Pakistan be recognized and a cooperative counter-Taliban effort be continued? Or should the U.S. rationalize in terms of delineating the respective responsibilities of the Pakistani Government and the international community? [Photo Courtesy: News4U, February 11, 2009]
What if the Obama Administration decides to sympathize with the growing influence of Taliban in Pakistan? The policy approach would then be largely rhetorical with huge cuts in aid and assistance. Several influential Pakistanis and Americans advocate this approach. Fatima Bhutto has in two recent articles Stop Funding My Failing State and Obama’s Murderous Guest has given her reasons her not sanctioning any aid to Pakistan. Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee had recently expressed doubts over increasing non-military to Pakistan following the latter’s inability to effectively counter the Taliban threat.
It is highly unlikely that President Obama would opt for this policy choice. The AFPAK strategy is premised on the rationale that stability in Afghanistan is contingent upon countering the Taliban in Pakistan. Hence merely sympathizing would tantamount to a withdrawal policy which seems improbable under current circumstances.
Empathizing with the challenges and problems of the Pakistani Government and people is another policy choice available for the Obama Administration. This implies that the U.S. understands and feels the strains on Pakistan’s polity and society emerging from the Taliban threat.
It is important o realize that this empathy has not emerged out of choice but was largely forced. The Taliban influence has not suddenly grown in Pakistan or in Swat for that matter. Benazir Bhutto before her death in December 2007 has categorically referred to the Taliban threat in Swat in her book Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West. The U.S. empathy or even sympathy at that time was non-existent. It is now, when the Swat Talibanization has come to threaten stability in Afghanistan the U.S. empathy in terms of policy advice and material assistance is set into motion.
The policy of empathizing has a particular problem: would the Obama Administration emphasize with the Government of Pakistan or the people of Pakistan? Even with the existence of electoral democracy Pakistan’s political elites do not fully represent and implement the will of the people. This does not mean that President Zardari is non-democratic but the personalization of Pakistan’s political institutions has confined the perimeter of popular sovereignty. Official accountability and responsibility as understood in the developed democracies is lacking in Pakistan. Given this divergence in approach the official and popular priorities in countering Taliban are not wholly overlapping. The Government uses the aid funds in a manner and in regions that are politically rewarding rather than strategically crucial. The Pakistan police continues to be underfunded and overwhelmed; the number of internally displaced persons living throughout Pakistan is 700,000 with numbers swelling given the recent military offensive; according to NWFP Information Minister Mian Iftkhar Hussain ‘not a penny’ was given to the Provincial Government by the Center in combating terrorism. It seems that the policy of empathizing is not yielding desirable results.
Could rationalizing be an option then? Rationalizing would imply empathizing with certain problems while merely sympathizing for others. The government of Pakistan objects to ‘aid with conditions’ but the policy of rationalizing aims at streamlining and discerning the aid provided to Pakistan. C. Christine Fair’s testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee earlier this week provides some helpful insights for rationalizing the U.S. policy with regard to Pakistan. Christine outlines five needs which according to me would go a long way in rationalizing the U.S. strategy.
Need for demand driven change: Most of the proposed areas for strengthening Pakistan’s civilian and even military capabilities presuppose—or should presuppose—some degree of effective partnering with Pakistanis who are vested in change. There is need to evolve a consultative approach where the U.S. partners with Pakistan to identity areas of reform in which U.S. assistance could be most constructive. Christine exemplifies this dimension by referring to the proposed changes in Pakistan’s educational system- the curriculum in particular. Any attempt by the U.S. to directly achieve this objective will further antagonize the nationalist and religious fervor of the Pakistanis. The U.S. could achieve the desired objective by supporting private school initiatives which provide cost-effective and better learning environment.
Expand Capacity to Execute Programs in Line with Pakistanis’ Preferences: The budgetary support to Pakistan has resulted in great disappointment with regard to the quality and quantity of benefits for the common people. Thus the U.S. will have to develop institutional capabilities and partner with international NGOs willing to provide more on-ground human cadre for ensuing that aid actually reaches the target segment.
Need for Pakistan to Pay for Itself: The U.S. will have to encourage Pakistan to raise revenues and redistribute these funds as services. According to Christine, Pakistan’s elected elites have been loathe to introduce meaningful efforts to raise revenue through property or other (e.g., capital gains) taxes or to initiate meaningful tax reform and tax collection efforts. The chronic interest of the international community to save Pakistan from itself has allowed the state to defer making hard choices about its budgetary commitment to an enormous defense infrastructure relative to human development and other investments focused on the well-being of its citizenry.
Need for Pakistan’s Police Force to Become More Effective in Dealing with Security Threats: Role of the police force in maintaining civil order can hardly be over-emphasized. The U.S. is struggling to train the police force in Afghanistan to ensure civil order. A similar approach needs to be adopted in Pakistan. The police force of Pakistan is more amenable to reform and could be trained for reducing the excessive dependence on Pakistan’s Army.
Need for a Transparent and Evidence-based Approach to Ensure Cooperation and Accountability: For securing maximum cooperation from Pakistan on issues of critical importance imposition of conditionalities would serve the purpose only partially. The U.S. has unilaterally imposed ‘conditions’ on aid provided to Pakistan for decades. As the record shows Pakistan has violated most of these conditionalities and the U.S. has continued with aid programs through waiver terms. The U.S. needs to evolve a process-oriented and benchmark approach developed in consultation with Pakistan. Both the United States and Pakistan must agree on how progress will be assessed and how remediation will be addressed. Pakistan must be a partner in achieving these objectives rather than an adversary being forced to acquiesce.
Hopefully the Obama Administration will move beyond feelings of sympathy and empathy to rationalize strategy for ensuring the stability of Pakistan and security of United States.