Replacing Huntington with Morgenthau in U.S. Foreign Policy

Islam has emerged as a dominant influence in U.S. domestic and foreign policy in recent years. A variety of issues ranging from Islam as an organizing principle of the socio-political systems to the nationalistic expressions of Islam; from Islam as a political force to Islam as an international threat – the U.S. and Islam have interacted in every possible way. Yet clouds of distrust have thickened and a sense of hostility marks mutual relations. Despite the positive rhetoric of President Obama not much has changed on the ground. Is there any approach that the U.S. can adopt for reconciliation with the followers (both nation-states and common people) of Islam?
For sure there is. This approach has nothing to with how the surge in Afghanistan must be conducted or how the non-military needs of Pakistan require prioritization. The new approach involves recognizing and addressing one basic flaw of U.S. diplomacy- the flaw of defining inter-state conflicts and interactions in socio-religious terms. Nation-states have interacted and national interests have conflicted in the arena of international politics; diplomacy doesn’t require these interactions and conflicts to be scripted in the language of religious or civilization distinctions or similarities. There is an urgent need to restore Morgenthau’s language of realpolitik in U.S. diplomacy by discarding references to other identity constructs. Whether it was President Bush’s policies based on the Clash of Civilizations theory or President Obama’s efforts at diplomatic outreach, nation-state specific policies have been replaced with references to Islam as a civilizational unit. The rhetoric of not being at war with Islam is as harmful as the policy of targeting Muslim majority states. The U.S. needs to realize that politico-strategic policy defines public diplomacy rather than vise-versa. It is imperative that use of the term ‘Islam and Islamic’ in the U.S. foreign policy discourse is minimized or at best discarded.
President Obama has sought to replace President Bush’s aggressive policies with a more reconciliation approach in global politics. This approach is undoubtedly welcome but rather than addressing the problem it has for two reasons aggravated the divisions.
Firstly, as stated above the very concept of ‘approaching the Islamic world’ seeks to reinforce division on civilization lines. Despite the strong forces of globalization, political leaders still represent nation-states and citizens continue to owe allegiance to their respective nationalities. Thus the U.S. in general and President Obama in particular will have to talk about interacting with and approaching Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey rather than the ‘Muslim world’.  This generalization not only offends the Muslim majority nations but very deeply hurts the U.S. interests. President Obama’s diplomacy should allow the U.S. to be friends or enemies with any nation in particular without having to extend the same policy to larger group bound by ties of common religion or civilization.�
Secondly, the reconciliation strategy itself is very objectionable. The reconciliation approach is singularly aimed at convincing the Muslim world that the U.S. is neither targeting Muslims nor waging war against Islam. The approach is based on the premise that the Muslims majority countries misunderstand the U.S. intentions and need to be enlightened about the willingness to amend past mistakes thereby charting a new course of mutual relations. It’s made to appear that the clash of civilizations concept originated in the Islamic world and the U.S. has nothing to do with it; the U.S. polices have been erroneously interpreted by the Muslim world through the clash of civilization paradigm.�
There is no doubt that a segment (which is increasingly growing) of the Muslims believe and advocate that Islam and Christianity are inherently conflicting and the U.S. need to be confronted. But a similar view exists among the Christians around the world as well.  The clash as an academic concept and policy tool is equally used by the Christian and Islamic worlds. Then why have the reconciliation efforts aimed at addressing the misperceptions among the Muslim people? Why does the U.S. public diplomacy not invest resources in communicating to its own population that the there exists a huge mass of Muslims who do not subscribe to the clash theory? Reconciliation exercises only convey the sincerity of the U.S. intentions to the Muslim world ignoring the necessity of communicating the voices of the non-extremist Muslim populations to the American public. �
The U.S. as a nation-state can have friendly or adversial relations with other nation-states not with other religious or social conglomerates. By re-asserting the nation-state paradigm in international dialogue, the U.S. will not only be able to gain a diplomatic advantage but also will also deprive the non-state actors any credibility as a global force. The U.S. foreign policy objectives should neither seek to alienate nor co-opt Islam; it should simply seek to safeguard national interests.