CPN (M) - Political Induction without Democratic Orientation

The political instability in Nepal following the resignation of P.M. Dahal was a potent crisis building to explode. While the international community was occupied with concerns of Taliban in Pakistan and LTTE in Sri Lanka, Nepal was gradually inching towards a crisis situation. The developments in Nepal are a stark reminder that forces of social and political extremism cannot be hurriedly inducted into mainstream politics of South Asian countries. But the current political turmoil has come as a blessing in disguise of Nepal’s democracy. Nepal’s struggling democracy has come under a challenge from which it can emerge stronger and healthier.
P.M. Pushpa Kamal Dahal had sacked Army Chief Genereal Rookmangud Katawal following the latter’s refusal to induct 19,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) members into the National Army (NA). Though the Nepali President Ram Baran Yadav had reinstated General Katawal, the loss of support from coalitional partners forced P.M. Dahal to resign on March 3.
The National Army’s confrontationist postures have made the political crisis even more critical. There have been reports that the NA was even planning a soft coup if the PLA cadres were forcefully integrated with the regular Army units.

Though CPN (M)’s policies and P.M. Dahal’s actions are largely responsible for the current crisis, the recent choices by the people of Nepal added an element of inevitability to the impending catastrophe.
By providing the CPN (M) the opportunity to freely participate in the national electoral process Nepal’s political system attempted to create an inclusive democracy. CPN (M)’s promise of grass-roots democracy and people’s empowerment ensured that the party received massive popular support. The CPN (M) emerged as the single largest party and in coalition with other Marxist forces formed the first republican democratic government in Nepal. The Maoists involvement in the political process was necessary and thus welcome; the problem arose when the Maoists were entrusted with the leadership responsibilities. It was soon realized that the process of political reconciliation, so vital for Nepal’s democratic stability, had been hijacked by the aggressive policies of the CPN (M).
The election of 2008 was CPN (M)’s first brush with democratic politics. For the sake of the Party and the country it was vital that the CPN (M) cadre and leadership were allowed to re-orient policy and strategy in accordance with democratic norms. But the CPN (M) was forced to adorn the leadership mantel soon after entering mainstream politics.
With the emergence of Prachanda as P.M. the expectations from and responsibilities of the CPN (M) multiplied beyond the Party’s capabilities. The politics of dialogue, reconciliation and bargaining that dictates the practice of democracy were not adopted by the CPN (M) and consequently Nepal’s fragile democracy came under strain. After decades of involvement in civil was against the nation’s political superstructure the Maoists were expected to renounce violence and democratize their outlook almost instantaneously. Few had expected the Maoists to succeed and the current phase of political turmoil was anticipated.
The action of removing the General Katawal without evolving a political consensus was a clear violation of the interim Constitution. Coalition partners from UML and opposition parties alike attacked the P.M. Dahal for his actions. There was little that P. M. Dahal could do to defend his actions. Increasing complaints that the Maoists cadres were involved in violence and reckless behavior of the CPN (M) supported Trade Unions had further weakened the P.M.’s position. P.M. Dahal’s resignation offers an opportunity to re-start Nepal’s democratic experiment.
P.M. Dahl’s resignation provides both the Party and the national political structure much needed breathing space. Popular unrest and political opposition to the Maoist form of politics had been growing in the country.  Thus if Dahal exhibits political maturity, the CPN (M) could utilize this opportunity to sit in the Opposition and appropriately train the Party’s cadre for democratic politics. Abandonment of political leadership along with assumption of wider socio-political responsibilities could help the Maoists in creating a sustainable democratic base.
  The PLA- NA integration can be alternatively explored by the concerned parties. The PLA cadre could constitute para-military forces connected to, but not absorbed within, the NA.
Nepal’s democracy had allowed the Maoists to integrate with the Country’s mainstream politics; now it’s for the Maoists to imbibe democratic norms for ensuing the Country’s political stability. The Maoists will not singularly be able to achieve this challenging objective; the other political parties, NA and national political structures would have to facilitate the CPN (M)’s complete transition to democracy.