The Obama era of National Security Reform

Two important developments in the recent days are hinting at real changes in the U.S. national security approach. President Obama’s promise of change is proving not to be mere rhetoric; concrete policy proposals are being discussed for transforming the security apparatus and approach of the U.S.

[Photo Courtesy:www.whitehouse.gov/]

The first was the Defense Budget recommendations put forth by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. In the words of Secretary Gates, the recommendations “represented a budget crafted to reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment.” The proposals for this ‘reform budget’, as Gate calls it, are revolutionary. Three primary objectives, according to Gates have been the guiding force in shaping the proposals and these include:
First, to reaffirm commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, viewed as America’s greatest strategic asset,
Second, to the department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance capabilities to fight the wars the U.S. is currently involved in and the scenarios the country is most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies,
Third, in order to achieve the above, the department needs to reform how and what is brought, meaning a fundamental overhaul of approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.
A new national security approach is reflected in several bold and innovative ideas proposed by Gates:
1. By proposing improvements in child care and spousal support, moving psychological health care programs from supplementary funding list to the Pentagon’s base budget, Gates had sought to re-focus on the human element in the Army. Referring to a major lacuna in the national defense approach Gates asserted that “until recently there has not been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today’s warfighter.” A large part of the proposal seeks to address and rectify the above problem.
2. A major modernization program to meet the country’s wartime needs has been proposed. The intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget is expected to be increased by $2 billion; research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms is to be initiated; improvements in improve inter-theater lift capacity and a host of other modernization programs have been elaborated in the proposal.
3. The conventional security challenges would continue to figure in the national defense strategy.  For this purpose tactical fighter capabilities would be upgraded, cyberspace security capabilities would be improved and ballistic missile defense capabilities would be provided for.
4. The proposal calls for acquisition and contracting reforms in the Defense Department. The VH-71 presidential helicopters program is recommended to be suspended; Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program and the $26 billion Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program are to be terminated. The Missile Defense Agency program is expected to be reduced by $1.4 billion.
New York Times editorial reported “Defense Secretary Robert Gates has made a credible effort to bring new discipline and focus to military spending after the unrestrained, inchoate years of the Bush administration.” Getting the Budget through the Congress is the next major hurdle that the Obama Administration faces.

The second development was more advisory and less official in nature, but nonetheless signals to a changing trend. A non-partisan Working Group of the Center of Law and Security, New York University, sponsored by the Markel Foundation released a report earlier this month titled “Reforming the Culture of National Security: Vision, Clarity and Accountability.”  The Working Group has explored the threat environment and essential response mechanisms of the United States to present a list of recommendations on the future strategic choices. The security structure outlined in the 1947 National Security Act was closely reviewed. The NYU Center on Law and Security held a series of discussions among officials of Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations along with representatives from the private sector and universities.
On the basis of the research findings, the Report put forth certain guidelines for restructuring the security apparatus to enhance national security:
1. According to the Report the primary challenge for the National security apparatus was the operational culture rather than structure of bureaucracy. To facilitate coordination, lines of authority and responsibility need to be clarified, perhaps by the national security adviser. The goal is to assign responsibility for assessing and responding to specific potential threats within and among the different agencies and departments. This would resolve the cultural vulnerability that cross-agency work can bring about. Clarification of mission and authority would make the interagency process stronger by minimizing competition.
2. The national threat assessment and response mechanism were handicapped by stovepiping and poor information sharing. The focus of reform should be on collaboration and information sharing rather than on restructuring existing institutions and departments or creating new structures. At the same time, mechanisms to improve interagency coordination cannot dilute individual accountability, including clearly defined metrics. Remedies must ensure that expertise and agency and department accountability remain strong. The discrete agencies must know their missions and bear responsibility for specific outcomes as well as for coordination efforts. It is important, however, to ensure that reform efforts do not simply replace the problems of poor or non-existent interagency processes with excessive interagency processes that dilute both accountability and expertise. What is needed is a new sociology rather than a new bureaucracy – a sociology that values integration and collaboration while respecting the work that must be accomplished by independent units of expertise.�
3. Mechanisms of accountability had to be devised for all stages of the process of collecting, analyzing, and responding to threat-related information. Initial statements of purpose (along the lines of the DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review), combined with the assignment of specific tasks and accomplishments, performance reports, and oversight reviews by Congress, would comprise the basic building blocks of an accountability mechanism.
4. To deal with the issue of cross-cutting threats multi-track, integrated approaches that address day-to-day management of the threat matrix would have to be created. These processes must include representatives from the spectrum of related fields. Coupled with clear lines of authority and responsibility, these processes should be geared towards information sharing and collaboration.
Reform and innovation seem to be the buzz word in most of the policy suggestions and proposals of the current administration. President Obama is positioning the U.S. for a major transformation in terms of national security and foreign policy outlook. Hopefully the ‘yes, we can’ magic works here as well.