It’s now called “AFPAK”

There is a recent and overwhelming influx of the term “AFPAK” in jargon of international relations. The term owes it origin to the new policy approach adopted by the Obama Administration. The intragency review of the international strategy in Afghanistan headed by Bruce Riedel concluded that the counter-terrorism efforts need to focus on the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. So now we have the AfPak war. Though President Obama’s intentions can barely be doubted there are some serious concerns that the U.S. will have to contend with in dealing with “AFPAK”.

[Photo Courtesy: Reuters/Jason Reed]
Firstly, I fail to comprehend what has been re-defined here. I mean apart from renaming the Global War on Terror as the AFPAK strategy there is hardly anything new in President Obama’s strategy. The drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan were initiated under the Bush Administration. The military surge and hard-soft power approach was also on the agenda of President Bush. Though there is nothing wrong with this approach, I intend to dispel the notion that President Obama’s strategy is any different from the one adopted by Former President Bush.
Secondly, President Obama’s objectives in the AFPAK chapter of the anti-terror campaign are unachievable. According to President Obama the focused and clear goal is: “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return in either country in future.” Both the immediate and long term implications of such a commitment are formidable. Did not the American public criticize President Bush and VP Cheney for advocating a prolonged commitment with regard to Afghanistan? According to some analysts President Obama has narrowed the U.S. objectives in Afghanistan by not referring to the goal of democratizing the troubled nation. Such claimants fail to realize that the President may have narrowed but at the same time has deepened the objectives. Is the goal of permanently dismantling the Al Qaeda a narrow one? For the information of those who think that President Obama has given up the goal of democracy promotion in Afghanistan kindly read the White Paper on the Interagency Policy Group’s Report. It categorically states that one of the U.S. goals in Afghanistan is “promoting a more capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan.”  That to my mind is paraphrasing democracy.
Thirdly, why is the U.S. conducting military strikes in the tribal regions of Pakistan? Why can’t the U.S. provide Pakistani forces with the intelligence and the equipment to conduct the strikes? The most obvious answer to this would be that the U.S. does not trust Pakistan. My follow up question would then be: what makes the U.S. sure that Pakistan will not allow the terror networks to re-emerge once the existing terrorists are killed (which is an impossible task).
Fourthly, what will the U.S. do about the ISI? India’s claims that the ISI was involved in aiding terrorism was brushed aside as expressions of traditional rivalry. According to the New York Times, American military officials believe that Pakistan’s military intelligence agency continued to offer money, supplies and guidance to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Will it be possible for the U.S. to change the long standing linkage of terror groups with the ISI?
Fourthly, this strange conception of segregating the hard-core Taliban from the reluctant cadre of militants appears an improbable task. President Obama is attempting to swing the pendulum to the opposite extreme by replacing President Bush’s ‘no-dialogue’ policy with a ‘let’s negotiate’ approach. It makes sense to talk to China, Russia and even Iran, but the idea of making peace with submissive elements of the Taliban sounds too ambitious. Is the U.S. State Department planning to hire Dr. Cal Lightman from the famous Fox Series ‘Lie To Me’ to discover the militants who have had a change of heart?
By highlighting these concerns I do not mean to criticize President Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy. I merely seek to emphasize that the challenge of combating terrorism is too complex and defies nation-state centric approaches. Initially it was Afghanistan then Iraq and then back to Afghanistan with the recent movement towards Pakistan. We continue to focus on nation-state centric strategies while terrorists being non-state actors continue to evade defeat. A conclusive end to the war on terror is contingent upon the realization of the fact that modernizing nations and combating terrorism are two different challenges; one might facilitate but will not accomplish the other.