Shuja Nawaz on “What Pakistan Doesn’t Need from America”

Shuja Nawaz, in a commentary on PostGlobal makes suggestions for altering the conduct of U.S. policy with regard to Pakistan. His analysis overlooks some important facts which would continue to dictate relations between the U.S. and Pakistan. Counter-View explores some of the flaws in the commentary.

Shuja Nawaz in his article, “What Pakistan Doesn’t Need From America” makes a fervent plea for recasting U.S.- Pakistan relations on the basis of some empirical realities (like the change of administration in U.S., global financial crisis and popular opposition to Pakistan fighting the war on behalf on the U.S.). But the empirical realities on which his analysis is based are selectively discerned. Many of the issues raised and terms used by Shuja Nawaz in his article are problematic.
Firstly, Shuja has erroneously referred to Richard Holbrooke’s mandate as “resolving regional differences and restoring stability to an embattled country.” He was obviously referring to Afghanistan as the embattled country and perhaps to Kashmir as the regional difference (regional disagreements exist over a variety of issues but in so far as difference is concerned Kashmir tops the list). In the words of Robert Woods, Acting Spokesman of the U.S. State Department, Kashmir is not in the mandate of Richard Holbrooke; “his mandate is to go out and try to help bring stability to Afghanistan, working closely with Pakistan to deal with the situation in FATA region.” Moreover, the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan will not be solely dependent on the analysis of Richard Holbrooke made during his recent visit to the region. According to the Obama Administration, Bruce Riedel is to lead an intra-agency review policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Holbrooke’s feedback is expected to contribute to the overall review process rather than determine it. Holbrooke’s inputs would be critical in shaping the future U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but there is a misconception about the centrality of his role.
Secondly, the suggestion of providing financial aid with conditions regarding its use is theoretically impressive, but practically untenable. Any attempt by the U.S. to link aid to such domestic issues as national tax structure, legal cover for investors, corruption in government establishment will immediately fuel anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan. Most of these issues fall within the jurisdiction of the national government and any attempt to influence them would amount to violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, further complicating the U.S. mission in the region.
Thirdly, the contention that the resentment in the Pakistani military is about the manner in which military aid and reimbursements from the U.S. is handled is not wholly accurate. The number of military fatalities is a cause of concern along with the negative publicity of being unable to combat the terrorist elements. The reputation and morale of the Pakistani military has been a collateral victim of the U.S. drone strikes in the tribal areas of the country. There is also the sense that, as in the past, the services of the Pakistani military are being used to serve the U.S. strategic goals in the region and once the objective is achieved the former will be dumped. Admiral Mullen had commented in November 2008 that there is not a Pakistani junior officer that doesn’t know who former Senator Pressler is and there is not a junior officer in the U.S. military that knows who Senator Pressler is. Admiral Mullen was referring to the 1985 legislation which banned economic and military aid to Pakistan unless certified by the U.S. President.
Fourthly, the suggestion that Pakistan should be allowed to manage the drone operations and take lead in identifying and attacking militant hideouts inside its borders negates the entire logic of the drone attacks. The U.S. is undertaking the drone attacks precisely because Pakistan was unwilling or unable to do so. The Pakistani establishment either lacked the political will (a view held by the critics of the Pakistani government) or did not have the information on the militant hideouts (a view held by the sympathizers of Pakistani Government). Suggesting that the successful U.S. drone operations be handed over to Pakistan, in the backdrop of the latter’s dismal performance on counter-terrorism, will require more than goodwill and rhetoric.
Fifthly, Pakistan’s assistance to Afghanistan in building the latter’s air base is a far stretched possibility. Pakistan undoubtedly has an important role to play in ensuring the stability of Afghanistan, but the enthusiasm to cooperate will have to be initially demonstrated on less complex and more urgent issues like better security at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, before ambitious the project of military cooperation can be discussed.
Finally, the expectation that U.S. should work towards altering regional perceptions of mutual animosities fails to appreciate the maxims of Realist School in International Relations. Despite the best intentions, President Obama is not on a goodwill mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan; his priority is serving U.S. strategic interests and he will concentrate his energies on it.
Shauja Nawaz’s intentions are undoubtedly noble but his prescription is defective.