Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism Resolution - Law or Hype?

The terrorist attacks on India’s financial capital, Mumbai, on November 26, 2008 raised concerns over Pakistan’s commitment and ability to fight terrorism. India has launched a diplomatic offensive against Pakistan by claiming to provide credible evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in the Mumbai terror attacks. The international community while emphasizing on the utility of handling the on-going crisis through diplomatic avenues maintains that Pakistan needs to act pro-actively in ensuring that terrorists do not receive official support or safe haven in its territory. Demands and suggestions relating to Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy have multiplied manifold following the Mumbai attacks. However there is little realization that the Mumbai attacks occurred only a month after Pakistan had reviewed its National Security Strategy and the Parliament had passed a 14-point Anti-Terrorism Resolution on October 22, 2008. The Resolution had sought to exemplify Zardari Government’s stand on counter-terrorism, in principle and policy. In the wake of the mounting pressures on Pakistan to crack down on terrorists it is important to ascertain the extent to which the Resolution has, or is capable of, altering Pakistan strategy to deal with terrorism.

Proposals of the Anti-Terrorism Resolution:

The Resolution serving as a signal post for the new National Security Strategy contained, among others, the following declarations and proposals:

• Extremism, militancy and terrorism in all forms and manifestations pose a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the nation-state.
• As a mechanism to fight terrorism all foreign fighters ‘if found, shall be expelled from Pakistani soil’.
• Dialogue is a top priority and would be utilized as a primary mechanism for conflict resolution within the nation. The government would not favor unconditional talks; only groups pledging to abide by the Constitution and respecting the rule of law would be invited for talks and negotiations. Military operations would continue to deal with forces opposed to talks with the Government.
• ‘Mechanisms for internal security would be institutionalized by paying compensation to the victims of violence and rehabilitate those displaced.’ The spill-over effects of terrorism will be contained throughout the country and public consensus will be built against terrorism through media and religious participation.
• Federalism would be strengthened through the process of democratic pluralism, social justice, religious values and tolerance and equitable resources sharing between the provinces as enshrined in the Constitution of 1973. Development of the troubled zones, especially the tribal areas would be immediately undertaken. New economic opportunities would be created to bring the less privileged areas at par with the rest of Pakistan. 
• The state will work towards establishing its writ, but through confidence building mechanisms by using customary and local jirgas. The military will be replaced as early as possible by civilian law enforcement agencies with enhanced capacity and sustainable political system.
• Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity would be safeguarded. Incursions and invasions in any form were opposed by all and the Government was called upon to deal with such challenges promptly. 
• It was also decided to form a committee to periodically review the implementation of the principles framed and roadmap given in the resolution. 

Potential of the Anti-Terrorism Resolution:

The Resolution was serious attempt to announce the strategic intentions of the new government. Open discussion and debate preceding the adoption of the resolution was intended to reflect the democratic credentials of Pakistan. But in terms of translating into an effective anti-terrorism strategy, the Resolution holds little promise. The intentions behind and content of the Resolution inherently limits its potential as a weapon to fight the threat of terrorism. The Resolution is more an attempt at image-redressal rather than strategizing the counter-terrorism approach; it is more an attempt at altering how the world views Pakistan’s anti-terrorism campaign rather than how to structure the actual campaign; it was more an attempt at pacifying the domestic public opinion rather than targeting the terrorist hide-outs within the country.

The apparent rationale behind drafting the Resolution was to review the national security strategy and refurbish the counter-terrorism campaign. National costs for and international criticisms about Pakistan’s inability to check the spread of terrorism were mounting. From the Marriott attacks to the continuous movement of terrorists across the Durand Line, efforts to counter the extremist ideology and terror activities by Pakistan had failed miserably. Hence the new Government sought to review the existing strategy and realign the strategic priorities in the war on terror through Parliamentary debate. In the nine years of President Musharraf’s rule the national security doctrine was never discussed and Pakistan’s involvement in the war on terror was viewed as ‘fighting another nation’s war’. The debate on the new strategic doctrine was expected to clarify Pakistan’s involvement in the war on terror as its ‘own war’. The new resolution sought to make counter-terrorism a national priority rather than merely an international commitment. In short, the purpose was to democratize Pakistan’s anti-terror campaign. 

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari sought to gain national and international credibility by drafting a new anti–terrorism strategy. A parliamentary resolution elucidating the Government’s commitment to counter-terrorism was expected to provide greater credence than former President Musharraf’s rhetorical statements. President Zardari was keen to convince the international community about his ability to evolve a national consensus on the fight against terrorism. With the objective of securing economic assistance from the international community, Pakistan attempted to present itself as a reliable ally in the global anti-terror campaign.

Several features of the Resolution, including the insistence on an ‘independent foreign policy’ were aimed to counter the strong anti-U.S. sentiment associated with the counter-terror operations in Pakistan. In response to popular opposition to the massive military operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Zardari Government had begun arming anti-Taliban tribal fighters for conducting the offensive. These militias, referred to as lashkars, were expected to achieve the government aims without resulting in popular alienation. Through the Resolution the Government expressed commitment towards the socio-economic development of the tribal areas. Such constituents of the Resolution were aimed at making the new anti-terror strategy ‘people friendly’ and ‘target-effective’.

In terms of commitment, the resolution does not spell out anything new. Pakistan’s opposition to terrorism and use of the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to counter terrorism has been repeatedly stated since September 2001. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, President Musharraf declared Pakistan’s unconditional support for the U.S. war on terror and opened the Pakistani airspace for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. On July 1, 2004, while chairing a high-level meeting in Islamabad, President Musharraf stated, “South Waziristan has become headquarters of al-Qaeda terrorists hiding there and their harbourers will be dismantled.” Until recently, the U.S. had commended former President Musharraf’s attempts at countering terrorism. Thus in pledging support for combating terrorism, the new resolution is a mere re-statement of Pakistan’s much publicized policy.   

Support of and not subordination to international counter-terrorism campaign was the favorite theme of former President Musharraf. In an address to the people of Pakistan on September 19, 2001 President Musharraf stated, that he gave “top priority to the defense of Pakistan, Defense of any other country comes later. We want to take decisions in the interest of Pakistan.” Hence the insistence of the Resolution on resolutely dealing with any violations of national sovereignty is reflective of the consistent theme of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism rhetoric. 

Though the resolution could garner a consensual vote in the Parliament, political opposition to the Government strategy continues to persist. The PML-N’s Parliamentary leader, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, had called upon the Government to summon former President Musharraf to the joint session to elaborate on the rules of engagement agreed upon with the U.S. Ahsan Iqbal, of the PML-N, said lawmakers would not be satisfied unless they were informed about the utility of the military operations so far and its fallout on national security. Such concerns have remained unaddressed during the recent discussions, exposing the fragility of the political consensus.

The task of countering terrorism within Pakistan will require the Government to launch massive offensive operations and confidence building measures in FATA. It needs to be realized that Central Government has had nominal control over FATA. Since 2004, the Central Government has attempted to make three peace accords in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In 2004, Government reached a deal with Pakistani Taliban led by Nek Mohammed in South Waziristan whereby the militants agreed to live peacefully and not use Pakistani soil against other countries. The accord was soon breached. In 2005 a written agreement was made between the Mahsuds and local administration. The militants agreed not to attack the military and administrative targets. The agreements never took off as Abdullah Mahsud, a local militant leader refused to recognize the accord and violence continued. August 2006 saw another peace agreement with local Taliban militants in North Waziristan. With the objective of making the peace accord broad- based, a committee comprising of 10 members, belonging to tribal elders, clerics and local administration was set up to ensure the implementation of the agreement. According to the agreement, the militants agreed not to attack the security forces of the state and it properties; restrain from running parallel administration; not to carry out target killings and departure of all foreigners in the region. The administration on its part agreed to release those arrested during military operations, restore the privileges and benefits of the tribal leaders; remove all new check-posts and remove the ban on display of arms. Despite the huge compromises made by the Government in the 2006 agreement, militancy in the tribal areas could not be checked. Historical evidence shows that dialogue as a mechanism for conflict resolution has limited utility in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The proposal in the Resolution to dispel all foreigners from Pakistani soil appears improbable. Most of the foreigners in the region belong to Chechnya, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian Republics, along with several Arabs and Afghans. They have settled here since the 1980s, taking up arms against Soviet Union in early years and later defying federal authority. These groups have mingled with the local population and difficult to discern. The earlier peace accords have failed to identify and expel the foreign elements residing in the tribal regions. The Government would have to devise an innovative mechanism for addressing this socio-strategic challenge.  

Finally, insistence on an independent foreign policy is difficult to realize, given Pakistan’s increasing reliance on international aid in general and U.S. support in particular. IMF has received fervent appeals for emergency assistance ensuring that Pakistan does not default on national debt payments. America is sponsoring a $400 million plan to train Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force patrolling the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. In a situation where Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Defense has to publish its report only after receiving financing from the U.S. state agency, the ability of the new government to disassociate themselves from the U.S. appears to be limited. 

Proposals of the Anti-Terrorism Resolution are vague and difficult to realize. Implementation of the policies elaborated in the Resolution would require massive economic resources, national consensus and intense political commitment. While the international community continues to debate about Pakistan’s political commitment to fight terrorism, many fail to realize the inadequacy of its legal instruments to undertake such an operation. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism campaign, in fact remains doubly hampered by the lack of credible laws and political will. Pakistan’s inability to deal with terrorists would be comprehensible if sincere policy and legal instruments were challenged on the ground. Unfortunately, laws in Pakistan have rarely, if ever, sought to target the phenomenon and network of terrorism. Pakistan’s lack of commitment to fight terrorism spans across the political class to impact the national legal mechanism as well. Commitment to acting against terrorism remains preceded by Pakistan’s commitment to devise strategies and frame laws for the same.