India’s Poor Show at Munich Conference

The Munich Security Conference 2009 was a forum for dialogue on global security issues, enthusiastically attended by leaders of over 50 nations. India was represented by National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan, but failed leave an impression, magnifying the shortcomings of Indian diplomacy.

Photo by Harald Dettenborn

The Munich Security Conference took place in Munich, Germany from February 6 to February 8, 2009. Founded as the “Wehrkundetagung” in Munich by the German publisher Ewald von Kleist in 1962, the scope of the Munich Conference has expanded to emerge as a political Summit. The importance of the Conference can be discerned from the fact that it was attended by the U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden to publicize the U.S. foreign policy under the new administration. In the words of the Conference Chair Wolfgang Ischinger, the Munich Conference has emerged as the “most important forum for the exchange of ideas by decision makers in the field of international security policy.” This year’s conference took place in the backdrop of complex international developments: the change of administration in U.S., global economic crisis, rising Indo-Pakistan tensions, non-proliferation concerns with regard to Iran and North Korea and the changing security concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For India, the Conference presented a unique opportunity to candidly discuss its politico-strategic doctrine before the global audience. India, keen to secure the permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council, was presented with a potent opportunity to voice her concerns and add credibility to her leadership claims at the Munich Conference. National Security Adviser (NSA) N.K. Narayanan was designated to represent India at the Munich Conference.
Mr. Narayanan’s speech at the Munich Conference was another example of how India can let go of critical diplomatic opportunities to attract international attention and garner global support.
Firstly, the delivery of the speech was sloppy, reflecting no passion or conviction. It appeared that the NSA was merely reading out a prepared text to cover his slot time at the Panel Discussion on “Non-Proliferation, Arms control and Future of Nuclear Weapons: Is Zero Possible?”
Secondly, the content of the speech was even more disappointing and highly repetitive. Rather than making a forward looking speech which juxtaposed India’s overall strategic perspective with contemporary regional and global challenges, the speech was a mere reiteration of Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 Action Plan at the U.N. General Assembly.
Thirdly, the speech lacked contextualization. Almost all speakers at the Conference made a case for the most immediate concerns confronting their state. Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai referred to the issue of increased U.S. troops deployment and notion of comprehensive security for durable peace in his country; British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs emphasized on energy security and alternatives if the dialogue process with Iran failed; Dr. Henry Kissinger, Former U.S. Secretary of State, referred to the U.S. disagreements with Iran and North Korea over the nuclear issue; Sergey B. Ivanov, First Deputy P.M. of Russian Federation, voiced apprehensions regarding U.S. missile bases in Europe. Thus every Speaker made a fervent case for their respective national interests. The speech of Mr. Narayanan was devoid of any such plea. There was no reference to the issue of nuclear weapons on the sub-continent, China’s nuclear program or even the Mumbai terror attacks. In stark contrast, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Makhdoom Qureshi’s speech not only linked Pakistan and Afghanistan’s strategic future, but also made references to former P.M. Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the national anti-terrorism resolution of November 2008. A simple reading of Mr.Narayanan and Mr. Qureshi’s speeches at the Munich Conference would exemplify the most compelling deficiency of Indian diplomacy.
Fourthly, the speech was not reflective of the transformed nature of Munich Conference. The Conference has graduated from a U.S.-Euro centric conglomeration that discussed Cold War threats to a dialogue on global security issues. India’s lack of interest in the Conference stems from her perceptual fixation of the Conference as a constituent of Cold War era. Discussions on nuclear proliferation and disarmament were included in the conference with the expectation that these issues had remained stagnant for years and exploration was imperative. Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General, IAEA, rightly summarized the change in discussions on nuclear proliferation by stating that under the given state of affairs, considerations of eliminating nuclear weapons was meaningless; the focus of non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue should be to create an environment where such deliberations would be more probable and meaningful. Mr. Narayanan’s speech continued to hinge on the opposite spectrum of probability by suggesting global non-discriminatory verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. In the words of Mr. Narayanan, “If this conference succeeds in not merely addressing the issue of nuclear reductions, but also devise pathways to their elimination, this might well be the transforming moment for the global community.” India’s support for global nuclear disarmament is undoubtedly a cherished goal, but under the changed international environment there is pressing need to focus on the concrete steps for achieving the same. India failed to realize that the mandate of the Munich Conference was not to suggest a plan for global nuclear disarmament, but a platform to exhibit how each nation state was practically contributing to make the world more safer.

India’s presence at the Munich conference went unnoticed. India needs to wake up to the realization that international dialogue forums exist beyond SAARC, UN and bilateral exchanges. Making innovative use of emerging forums remain vital to India’s global presence and critical to her national interests.